### SRB CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

SUBSYSTEM: SEPARATION

ITEM NAME: Fwd Booster Separation Motor (BSM)

PART NO.: 10317-0001-805, -806 FM CODE: A07

ITEM CODE: 30-01-06 REVISION: Basic

CRITICALITY CATEGORY: 1R REACTION TIME: Immediate

NO. REQUIRED: 4 Forward DATE: March 1, 2002

CRITICAL PHASES: Boost SUPERCEDES: March 31, 2000

CN 044

FMEA PAGE NO.: B-20A ANALYST: T. Burke/S. Parvathaneni

SHEET 1 OF 4 APPROVED: S. Parvathaneni

FAILURE MODE AND CAUSES: Premature ignition of the igniter, main grain or BKNO3 (two BSMs) caused by:

- o High temperature
- o Shock
- o Vibration
- o Increased sensitivity due to contamination
- o Electrostatic discharge
- o Acoustics

FAILURE EFFECT SUMMARY: Loss of separation thrust results in loss of mission, vehicle and crew.

### REDUNDANCY SCREENS AND MEASUREMENTS:

- 1. N/A
- 2. Fail Loss of redundancy not detectable by flight or ground crew.
- 3 Pass

# RATIONALE FOR RETENTION:

### A. DESIGN

Design Specification is USA SRBE 10SPC-0067.

# o High temperature

- BKNO3, booster charge, shall not ignite when subjected to a temperature of 400°F for 15 minutes or 210°F for six hours.

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 Propellant - Predicted high temperature of BSM motor propellant including igniter grain will not exceed 106°F. FM Code: 30-01-06-A07 Date: March 1, 2002

- BSM propellant is qualified to 120°F per Test Report CSD 5180-79-109 and CSD-5596-88-3.
- o Shock Fwd BSM does not experience an ordnance shock environment. The Aft BSM was subject to ordnance shock as reported in CSD 5180-79-109 and CSD-5596-88-3.
- o Electrostatic discharge/Lighting Effects Propellant is encased in aluminum which is hard mounted to primary structure. The mounting surface of the BSM shall be free of resistive film and contamination so as to produce a 2.5 milliohm maximum electrical bonding.
- o Vibration Vibration performed on eight motors per qual test report CSD 5180-79-109. Vibration performed on four motors per qual test report CSD-5596-88-3. Acoustic environment is included in vibration test criteria.
- Delta Qualification Tests
  - The FWD BSM was qualified per qual test reports CSD-5180-79-109 and CSD-5596-88-3.
  - CSD 5597-93-2 delta qualification tests for BSM configuration 10317-0001-805. Delta qualification on two units subjected to environmental and functional tests.
- B. TESTING
- o None

# C. INSPECTION

- o All listed vendor related inspections are conducted 100% by vendor (or sub-tier vendor) QA personnel. Where no designated QA organization exists at a vendor, inspections are witnessed/monitored by CSD QA personnel or inspection records are evaluated for compliance with quality system requirements by CSD QA personnel.
- All listed KSC related inspections are conducted 100% by USA SRBE or SPC QA personnel.

#### VENDOR RELATED INSPECTIONS

#### **Propellant Constituents Inspections**

Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Butadiene

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Hydroxyl value

Water

Iron

Peroxide

Antioxidant

Viscosity @300 C

Insolubles

- Infrared spectra analysis performed to identify material Isophorone Diisocyanate
- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

NCO equivalent weight

Dimer

Density @200 C

Hydrolyzable chloride

Water

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- Infrared spectra analysis performed to identify material

# Di-octyl Adipate

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Ester content

Specific gravity at 25 °C

Acidity, as acetic acid

#### Stabilizer

- Melting point is verified by test and data evaluation

# **Bonding Agent**

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Imine equivalent weight

Hydrolyzable chloride

Moisture (weight percent)

- Infrared spectra analysis performed to identify material

#### Aluminum

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Free aluminum metal

Volatiles

Ether Extractables

Particle size distribution

#### Ferric Oxide

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Ferric oxide, assay

Loss on ignition

Water content

pH, water suspension

Particle size distribution

# Ammonium Perchlorate (Standard)

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Ammonium perchlorate assay

Tricalcium Phosphate

Total water

pH of water solution

Sulfated ash

Particle size

### Ammonium Perchlorate (90 micron)

- Chemical/physical properties of the following constituents are verified by test and data evaluation.

Ammonium perchlorate assay

Tricalcium Phosphate

Total water

pH of water solution

Sulfated ash

Particle size

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- o Igniter/Motor Moisture/Contamination
  - A 100% inspection is performed on the interior of the motor just prior to installation of the nozzle assembly and taping weather seal on nozzle.
  - Installation of security bag and lead seal verified.
  - BKN03 velostat bag is processed in a nitrogen box and purged with nitrogen until it reaches a specified relative humidity. Relative humidity is verified and BKNO3 bag welds are vacuum tested and verified.

#### KSC RELATED INSPECTIONS

- o Receiving Inspection (All Failure Causes)
  - Verify for each BSM received there is no evidence of damage, corrosion, misalignment or moisture per OMRSD File V, Vol. I, requirement number B000FL.005.
- o FWD BSM Installation Inspections per 10REQ-0021. (Electrostatic Discharge)
  - Electrical bonding resistance check between SRB Structure ground and BSM verified per para. 1.2.1.2.6.
  - Electrical bonding resistance check between BSM and Frustum verified per para. 1.2.1.2.6.
  - Aerosheat Shield (AHS) cover seal integrity is tested by verifying no visual leakage for forward BSM AHS per para. 1.1.3. (Contamination)

# D. FAILURE HISTORY:

Failure histories may be obtained from the PRACA database.

- E. OPERATIONAL USE
- o Not applicable to this failure mode.

Supercedes: March 31, 2000 DRD 1.4.2.1-b